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The aim of this study is to measure horizontal equity in the use of healthcare services in 
Spain, proposing two methodological innovations. First by defending it  as equality of 
access  for  equal  need,  irrespective  of  educational  level,  unlike  the  prevailing 
methodological approach to horizontal equity which relates it to income. Second, by 
estimating it by means of the slope index of the inequality of characteristics, analagous 
to the inequity index proposed by Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997; HIWV) 
but  presenting  some  methodological  advantages,  the  greater  robustness  of  the  data 
available on educational level than of those on income, and the possibility of isolating 
the net effect of the educational level on the use of healthcare by controlling for other 
variables. 
 
 The methodology is designed in three parts: (1) estimation of the relationship between  
the  educational level and the use of healthcare services by means of a model of the 
likelihood  of  demand  for  healthcare  services,  commonly  used  in  the  literature;  (2) 
estimation of the relationship between educational level and health by approximating a 
production function of individuals' health according to their personal characteristics and 
other factors conditioning health; and (3) estimation of the slope index of inequality as a 
measure  of  horizontal  inequity,  using    educational  level  instead  of    income  as  the 
criterion for ranking individuals.  
 
The data base used was a sample of 55,598 observations from the Survey of disabilities, 
handicaps and state of health of 1999, carried out in Spain. No significant statistical 
association was found between educational level and use of healthcare services. On the 
other hand, the relationship between educational level and health, with the three proxy 
variables used (perception of health, days of limitation and number of chronic illnesses) 
shows a positive correlation, i.e. an increase in educational level is associated with a 
greater probability of enjoying better health. 
 
Horizontal inequity, measured by the proposed slope index of inequality, gives a  range 
of statistically significant values between 13.91% and 9.40%, depending on cases, i.e. 
the significant inverse relationship between state of health and educational level is not 
reflected proportionally in healthcare use, implying that, with greater need, the access of 
individuals with a lower educational level to public healthcare services is the same as 
for the rest.   
 
These results suggest that the educational level may be a variable to consider when 
characterizing the healthcare needs of a population in a defined geographical area, at 
least from the normative characterization of horizontal equity proposed.  
 
Key words: Education and health; Healthcare needs; Horizontal Inequity; Logistic 
regression ; Ordinal regression; Regional funding. 
 
  
Códigos JEL: C21; H42; H77; I12; I20  
 HORIZONTAL INEQUITY IN ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE SERVICES AND 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL IN SPAIN. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
      
One of the fundamental objectives of the healthcare policies of developed countries is 
the  equity  of  their  healthcare  systems.  However,  there  is  no  definition  or  single 
measurement  of  this.  One  of  the  most  frequent  normative  approaches  is  horizontal 
equity, understood as equal treatment for equal need. Healthcare need can be defined in 
several ways: level of health, resources used, capacity to benefit from treatments, etc  
though  empirical  studies  frequently  use  measures  of  perception  of  health,  or  of 
morbidity, as a  proxy of clinical need.  
 
A substantial part of the literature interprets the principle of horizontal equity in relation 
to wealth as equal treatment for equal need, independently of the level of income(Van 
Doorslaer et al, 2000). This study investigates horizontal equity with reference to the 
educational level, defining it as equal treatment for equal need independently of the 
educational  level.  This  approximation  is  particularly  attractive  for  countries  whose 
institucional  framework  guarantees  to  their  citizens  a  broad  collective  insurance, 
independently  of  their  income  level,  as  is  the  case  of  the  Spanish  National  Health 
System  (SNS)  ,  where  wealth  should  not  be  the  greatest  barrier  to  access. 
Methodologically it presents the significant advantage of greater quality and quantity in 
the data available in health surveys. For example in the Spanish National Health Survey 
of 1999 (EDDES99), out of a total of 60,666 individuals interviewed, only 37 (0.061%) 
did not respond about their educational level whereas 10,299 (16.98%) did not respond 
regarding their level of income. The poor quality of the data on income, derived from 
resistance or lack of knowledge, makes it necessary on occasions to make estimations of 
income (Urbanos, 2000; Alvarez, 2001) which are not needed if horizontal equity is 
defined in relation to the educational level. 
 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  horizontal  equity  in  access  to  public 
healthcare services in Spain in relation to educational level, as well as the relationship 
between educational level and health. More specifically we analyze to what extent,  for 
equal  need,  differences  may  be  occurring  in  access  to  public  healthcare  services 
according to individuals' educational levels.  
 
From  this  perspective  horizontal  equity  was  measured  by  means  of  the  slope  of 
inequality,  with  characteristics  similar  to  the  inequity  index  (HIWV)  of  Kakwani, 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997). To construct it, an index of access to healthcare 
services is calculated, and an index of health in relation to educational level. The slope 
index of inequality has been  defined as the comparison between the coefficients of 
straights  of  use  and  health  according  to  educational  level.  Significant  differences 
between the two indicate horizontal inequity .  
 
The  relationship  between  the  educational  level  and  the  health  of  a  population  has 
traditionally  been  studied  in  the  context  of  developing  countries,  where  the  links 
between  education  and health  are  usually  presented  in the form  of  high  correlation 
between low schooling rates, high mortality rates and uncertain economic and social  
growth  and  stability 
1(Wang,  2002;  Canagarajah  and  Ye,  2001).    In  the  context  of  
developed countries the accent is usually placed on finding the causal mechanisms  that 
link educational level with health, establishing the efficient level of investment, and 
analyzing the relationship between educational levels and equality of access and results 
in health.  
 
The predominant conceptual framework of the majority of studies is that provided by 
Grossman  (1972),  who  deals  with  the  relationships  between  Education  and  health 
within the neoclassical theory of human capital. Health is the result of a production 
function in which education constitutes an important input. Fuchs (1982) suggests the 
possibility that both are conditioned by a third, the personal time discount rate, so that 
the individuals with a lower discount rate would be interested in promoting jointly their 
health  and  education  so  the  simple  direct  relationship  between  the  two  could  be 
considered  spurious
2.  The  direction  of  the  causality  can  also  be  the  subject  of 
discussion; it is thus possible that good health is what permits higher levels of education  
to be attained (Perri, 1984). Other studies  (Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg, 2002; Glied 
and Lleras-Muney, 2003) suggest that it is the special predisposition of more educated 
people to accept new medical treatments and new medicines that leads to better  health 
results. 
 
The analysis of the relationships between inequalities of health and of access and certain 
variables  such  as  income  or  education  presents  some  methodological    limitations 
(López-Casasnovas and Rivera, 2002).  Fuch (1982) or Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg 
(2002) detect a potential endogeneity between the level of health and that of education 
because the cause-effect process can go in different directions. However, a large part of 
the literature finds that the direct effects of education on health are greater than the 
indirect ones, i.e. the health-education-health reciprocal ones. (Kemma, 1987;Berger 
and  Leigh,  1989;  Haveman  et  al.  1994)
3.    Arendt  (2001)  detects  the  presence  of 
endogeneity between education and health at two distinct levels: on a first individual 
plane, people who appreciate education also appreciate health, but on a second plane, 
both variables are conditioned by  aggregated third-party variables (society in which it 
occurs, parents' cultural level, rurality, etc.) in the sense that the educational level of the 
milieu also influences both education and individual health . 
 
Subjective measurement of health, as is the case of self-assessment of the state of health 
or that of feeling limited for certain everyday tasks, faces at least two difficulties: the 
absence of a universally accepted standard of what should be considered good or bad 
health,  and the incentives that some individuals have not to declare their true state of 
health  (Anderson  and  Burkhauser,  1984;  Bound,  1991;  or  Waidman,  Bound,  and 
Schoenbaum, 1995).   
 
 
Notwithstanding these problems it is a solid and dynamic program of research; we could 
mention the studies by Grossman (1973) Lairson et al. (1984); Sickles and Taubman 
                                                
1   The importance of these matters has aroused the interest of numerous international organizations 
(World Bank, 2002a and b; OECD, 2002; UNESCO, 2001) through various programs (e.g.. Education 
For All (EFA), as well as a profusion of recommendations for political intervention (Roberts, 2003). 
2   In this same sense the relationship could also be much influenced by the quality or healthiness 
of the different jobs  that are usually accessed depending on the educational level attained (Kemna, 1987). 
3   Kemna (1987), for example, goes so far as to affirm that from 70 to 95% of the total effect is 
direct from education to health.  
(1986), Lleras-Muney (2002) Lleras-Muney and Lichtemberg (2002) or Ghosh (2001) 
for  the  case  of  the  U.S.A.;    Kennedy  (2003)  comparing  the  cases  of  Canada  and 
Australia;  Wagstaff  (1986)  for  the  case  of  Europe;  or  Arendt  (2001);  Hartog  and 
Oosterbeek (1998) Townsend, Davison and Whitehead (1988) for Denmark, Holland or 
England respectively, etc.  
 
In Spain there are several studies relating to equity of access, among which can be 
quoted those directed by  van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, in 1986, 1997, 2000 and 2002  at 
international level, or Urbanos, 2000 specifically referring to Spain. The literature that 
has studied specifically the relationships between health inequalities and educational 
level is small, e.g. Borrell and Pasarín (1999) Borrell et al (1999), Benach and Yasui 
(1999) Benach (2001) or Escardibul (2002 and 2003).  
 
There are, however, no studies to estimate horizontal equity defined in relation to the 
educational  level,  by  means  of  the  slope  index  of  inequality  as  in  this  study.  This 
approximation is particularly attractive for a healthcare policy that aims to reduce social 
inequities in health. In Spain it constitutes a modest contribution to the debate on the 
healthcare need variables that must be included in the model of funding at regional 
level. 
 
The current debate as to the variables of need that should form part of the new funding 
model for the autonomous regions is focussed on  demographic variables, ignoring the 
possibility that people's social characteristics may condition their capacity to access and 
make  use  of  the  offer  of  public  services.  Given  that  the  different  Autonomous 
Communities  (regions) present  different  aggregate  profiles  in  respect  of  educational 
level,  income,  and  socio-economic  conditions  in  general,  the  fact  that  the  current 
political  debate  on  the  new  regional  funding  model  ignores  this  dimension  is  an 
interesting test of the values  that in reality guide the actions of the political elites.   
 
The text is organized in three sections. First we describe the methodology adopted for 
the estimation of the relationships between educational level, healthcare utilization, and 
health. We also develop the measure of horizontal equity based on the slope index of 
inequality.  The  second  section  sets  out  the  results  obtained.  A  brief  section  of 
conclusions closes the paper. 
 
1. METHODOLOGY  
 
The data base used was the health module of the Survey of Disabilities, Defects and 
State of Health (Encuesta sobre Discapacidades, Deficiencias y Estado de Salud, 1999) 
(EDDES99), carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, in collaboration with 
the  Instituto  de  Migraciones  y  Servicios  Sociales  and  the  Fundación  ONCE.   The 
territorial scope is all Spain, the method is stratified random sampling and the procedure 
is  by  personal  interview  at  the  respondent's  home.  The  microdata  file  contains 




                                                
4   This survey is the ordinary Health Survey corresponding to the year 1999. With the difference, 
and the advantage, that other health surveys, which are carried out every two years, usually have from 
6,000 to 20,000 entries while in this one a more than 70,000 individuals were interviewed. This survey, 
furthermore,  incorporates  the  so-called  elevation  factor  which  has  been  considered  in  the  various 
estimations.  
  The methodological strategy employed is divided into three phases:  
a)  Estimation  of  the  relationship  between  educational  level  and  the  use  of 
healthcare services. 
b)  Estimation of the relationship between educational level and health. 
c)  Estimation of the slope index of inequality as a measure of horizontal inequity.  
 
For  the    relationship  between  educational  level  and  utilization  we  estimated  a 
probability model of the demand for healthcare services, habitually used in the literature 
(Phelps  and  Newhouse,  1973;  Hartog,  1998;  Contoyannis,  Jones  and  Rice  2001; 
Jiménez-Martin Labeaga and Martinez, 2001 and 2002; Escardibul, 2003, etc.): 
 
  Pr (yij =1|Xi) =  Λj (β Xi) + εij  [1] 
 
Where yij is the probability that the individual i will demand healthcare service  j and Xi 
is the matrix reflecting his or her state of health and the characteristics (personal, social, 
economic, etc.) that condition his or her health, β is the vector of estimators. Given that, 
in the data base used, the variables reflecting the use of each healthcare service are 
dichotomous (1: does use; 0: does not use) it is appropriate to use a logistic model, so Λ 
will represent the linking logit function
5 and finally εij captures the random disturbances 
which we assume to be uncorrelated with the regressors. The model developed is also 
usually presented with the following notation: 
 
  [ ] ) X β ( exp 1
1
) X | Y ( P
i ij
i ij − +
=    [2] 
 
 
The  independent  variables  were  selected  by  means  of  a  double  filter,  study  of 
multicollinearity by means of the index of condition
6 and the inclusion of significant 
variables  by  the  “Wald  forward”  method
7.  Also,  individuals  aged  under  23  were 
excluded from the sample because it is estimated that, up to that age, the educational 
level may still be being completed; also the residents of Ceuta and Melilla and some 
                                                
5   In the case of medicos_ss or analisis_ss or enf_cron the EDDES99 measures the frequentation, 
so  count  estimation  models  could  also  have  been  used;  however    both  have  been  transformed  into 
dichotomous variables for several reasons: a) the estimated parameters of the logistic model (OR’s) have 
an immediate probabilistic interpretation  b)  for the final elaboration of the index of inequality, it is 
considered  of  interest  for  the  parameters  to  be  homogeneous  and,  given  that  they  include  dummy 
variables (farma_ss; limit; estasalud) that can only be estimated by means of logit (or probit) models, it is 
recommendable to reduce them all to this expression. c) the number of visits to the doctor, the number of 
diagnostic tests or the chronic illnesses diagnosed are not independent of each other; d) most of these 
variables have the value either zero  or one, so the loss of information is minimal. Of 55598 cases,  
61.17% of enf_cron, 95.88% of medicos_ss and 98.39% of analisis_ss are zeros or ones .  
6   The index of condition  applies principal component factor analysis to all the variables. The self-
value of each component is calculated. The self-value is the proportion of variance that each component 
explains exclusively, so that a self-value close to zero implies that that dimension is highly correlated 
with others. The index of condition is the square root of the ratio between the highest and the lowest self-
values. Foe Belsey (1991) collinearity is serious when the index of condition exceeds 30 points. 
7   This consists in the configuration of econometric models consecutively introducing variables 
accotrding to the amount of variability that they explain and excluding those that explain little. The Wald 
index  is,  in  logistic  regression,  what  the  t  statistic  is  in  linear  regression.  This  process  maximizes 
explanatory  capacity  with  the  greatest  possible  succinctness.  When  the  inclusion  of  a  variable  has 
improved the general significance of a regression model, it has been included in the rest of the models in 
order to make the estimations comparable; this is why in the annex some models contain some variables 
that are of little significance.  
observations  considered  strange  or  lacking  responses
8.  These  selections  reduce  the 
sample  to  18  healthcare  variables  in  respect  of  55,598  individuals  representating 
28,754,100 residents in Spain (table 12 of the annex).  
 




Table 1. Selected (dependent) variables of use  
  Name  Description  Characteristicas 
farma_ss  Consumption of medicines with SNS 
prescription  
dichotomous 
farma  Consumption of unprescibed  medicines  dichotomous 
médicos_ss  SNS medical and  nursing services   dichotomous 
 
análisis_ss  Attendance at SNS diagnostic tests   dichotomous 
 
The  variable  relating  to  the    completed  level  of  education  (estudios)  was 
structured in five basic categories  (Table 2). 
  
Table 2 Categories of level of education 
  Frecuency  Percentage  s.d. 
estudiosno  (Illiterate or no education)  10551  0.1898  0.392 
estprim  (Primary education)  19020  0.3421  0.474 
estsec1  (Secondary education-first cycle)  7716  0.1388  0.345 
estsec2 (Secondary education-second cycle)  8579  0.1543  0.361 
estsup (Higher educ.-University and Professional)  9732  0.1750  0.380 
Total  55598     
 
To  study  the  relationships  between  health  and  education,  a  production  function  of 
individuals'  health  is  proxied  by  means  of  their  personal  characteristicas  and  other 
factors conditioning health. In the model in equation [1] , yij  has been interpreted as the 
state of  health of each individual i measured in the dimension of health j which may be 
objective or subjective. In the EDDES99 various questions were introduced in respect 
of individual health, three of which were selected: self-assessment of the state of health; 
days limited in daily activities and diagnosis of a chronic illness. The first two are 
subjective dimensions and the last objective. Xi is the matrix of independent variables  
(table 13 of the annex). 
 
The dependent variable self-assessment of the state of health can adopt five discrete 
values, from 1, very good perceived health, to 5, very bad. In this case we have used the 
ordinal logistic regression (Propper, 2000) based on the methodology introduced by 
McCullagh (1980), whose multivariate version has the  form: 
 
  [ ] 1 c ,.. 2 , 1 s X β ... X β β α
) s Y ( P
) s Y ( P
ln ) s Y ( P it log m m 1 1 0 s − = + + + + =
≤
= ≤
f    [3] 
 
                                                
8   Such exclusions are normal in the majority of studies of this subject  since such groups present a 
particular heterogeneity that conditions the estimations of the rest of the population. To these effects we 
considered to be strange observations those that declared more than 14 visits in the previous 14 days  (18 
observations). Also, in the sample there were 24 individuals who did not respond as to their educational 
level. 
9   The  survey  contained  other  dimensions  of  use  of  healthcare  services  and  assets  such  as  : 
hospitalization,  surgery,  physiotherapy,  odontology,  ambulance,  etc.  but  they  are  excluded  from  this 
analysis because, due to the lack of response, there is a reduction of the sample mass below the minimum 
necessary for obtaining significant results in respect of the educational level. 
  
This specification permits us to obtain a single estimation of β:  
  ) s | x ( Odds
) s | x ( Odds





= ;  [4] 
 
in the case  where two individuals only differ in one variable by one unit. This measure 
the likelihood that an individual will present the characteristic of interest, in our case 
enjoys a certain level of health, cumulatively up to level s. 
 
Third and finally, as a measure of horizontal inequity we estimate the slope index of 
inequality, which compares the slopes of the curves of use and health according to 
educational level. This index is used in epidemiology and presents properties analogous 
to the inequity index (HIWV) of Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997)
10.  
 
If y1i is defined as the OR’s of use of a healthcare service, educ as the relative order of 
educational levels, and u1i the disturbances that are assumed to be normal, the regression 
can be written: 
 
  y1i = α1 + β1 educ + u1i  [5] 
 
To capture the information on the distribution of the population, we resolve with a 
linear estimator by weighted least squares (WLS) or where  1 β ˆ
 is the slope of use of 
healthcare services according to educational level.  
 
If y2i is defined as the OR’s of enjoying, or suffering from, a certain state of health, then  
in the regression: 
 
  y2i = α2 + β2 educ + u2i  [6] 
 
2 β ˆ  will be the slope of  health against educational level. The difference between the two 
slopes  (IDP)  will  be  a  measure  of  inequity  of  the  system,  IDP  = 2 β ˆ   –  1 β ˆ   .  An 
elementary test for measuring whether or not the difference of estimations is significant 
is that based on Student's t . 
 
                                                
10   The  concentration  and  inequality  index  of  Kakwani  (1997)  (KWV)  is  based  on  the 
approximation of the Gini index by Yitzhaki (1984), which can be written as:  
[ ] ) R 1 ( , y Cov
µ
2
C i i − − =
 
  where yi is the use of the healthcare service, Ri the relative position of each individual i according 
to income and µ is the mean healthcare use of the sample ( i y µ =
). This can be calculated alternatively 
by means of the appropriate regression  (van Doorslaer et al., 2000): 
i i
i 2
R u R β α
µ
y
σ 2 + + = =
 
  where  β ˆ
 is the index of concentration. Defining yi as healthcare use we estimate (estimator 
MCP)  1 β ˆ
= CM as the index of concentration of use and defining yi as the expected (estimated) healthcare 
use we obtain  2 β ˆ
= CN as the index of concentration of need, the index of horizontal inequity (HIWV) is 
the difference between the two HIWV = CN – CM. The expected healthcare use is obtained by means of an 
auxiliary regression :  y*i = F(edad, género, enf_cron, estasalu). 
  
Its interpretation is immediate and analogous to that proposed by van Doorslaer et al. 
(2000): if the difference between the two slopes is significant, horizontal inequity exists, 
since the use according to educational level is  different (greater or less) than the need. 
 
  While the index of horizontal inequity (HIWV) compares the slope of use with that of 
estimated use according to income, where use is estimated on the basis of the state of 
health, the index of inequality that is proposed here compares the slope of use directly 
with  that  of  the  state  of  health  according  to  educational  level.  The  principal 
methodological difference arises from the consideration of control variables. The index 
of inequality proposed captures the net effect of educational level on healthcare use by 
controlling  for  the  other  variables  (locality  of  residence,  marital  status,  healthcare 
habits, type of job, etc.) which does not occur with the index of horizontal inequity 






We  describe  below  the  results  of  the  three  types  of  analysis  considered  relating  to 





3.1. USE OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
 
As we can observe in table 3, the probability of consumption of medicines prescribed by 




Table 3. Odds Ratios of consuming medicines  prescribed by the SNS.  farma_ss 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
  EST_NO (Ref)  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  -0.029  0.034  0.718  0.397  0.972 
   ESTSEC1  0.003  0.044  0.006  0.936  1.004 
   ESTSEC2  -0.085  0.045  3.469  0.063  0.919 
   ESTSUP  -0.078  0.045  2.972  0.085  0.925 
   Constant  -3.011  0.180  279.605  0.000  0.049 
                                                
11   The data presented in the tables are: the estimated parameter ( β ˆ
) and its standard error; the 
Wald coefficient, the interpretation of which for the logistic regression is similar to that of the t in the 
linear  regression;  the  p-value  that  indicates  the  statistical  significance;  finally  the  odds  ratios 
(OR=exp(B)). The Odds are a magnitude representing the probability of an event occurring as against it 
not occuring (Odds: [ ] { } ∞ ∈ ℜ ; 0 ). An ORi higher than 1 indicates that the event is more likely to occur 
and by what amount the Oddsi exceeds the variable of reference and viceversa. If we define: OR = exp(βi)  
and Oddsi = exp(βi) exp(cte), the conversion between probability and OR can be calculated as : 
 
  Pri (y | Xi) = Oddsi  / 1+ Oddsi 
 
  The Odds of the categories of reference are reflected in the constant of the model. In the case of 
education, the individual of  reference (IR) belongs to the category of “Illiterate or no education”. 
 
 
12    The estimations of the rest of the variables figure in the annex.   
 
 
 The Odds Ratio (OR) between the lower educational level of reference, and the higher, 
university education, is 0.905. If this is expressed in terms of probability, the individual 
of  reference  (IR)
13  with  a  university  education,  which  is  the  only  category  with 
significant differences 
14, has a probability of consuming medicines of  4.34%
15  as 
against 4.67% for the population without education.  
The results change when private consumption of medicines is considered, as 
reflected in Table 4 where the total consumption, public and private, is considered.  
 
Table 4. Odds Ratios of consuming medicines. farma 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
   EST_NO  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  0.048  0.036  1.836  0.175  1.049 
   ESTSEC1  0.141  0.044  10.280  0.001  1.151 
   ESTSEC2  0.138  0.045  9.472  0.002  1.148 
   ESTSUP  0.205  0.045  21.011  0.000  1.227 
   Constant  -3.128  0.179  307.015  0.000  0.044 
 
 
The probability of consumption of medicines is now higher depending on educational 
level. Furthermore the statistical significance is general except in the case of estprim. 
The results suggest both a lower opportunity cost and a greater propensity to consume 
medicines according to educational level.  
 
With regard to the probability of being attended to by non-hospital healthcare staff 
16,  
the increase in educational level reduces the probability of use. Nevertheless, just as in 
the case of farma_ss, the differences are significant only for the extreme groups. For 
example, the probability of use of this service by the IR without education is 5.93% and 
that of the educated group with higher education is 5.13%. (Table 5) 
 
 
Table 5. Odds Ratios of being attended by (non-hospital) healthcare staff. medicos_ss 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
  EST_NO  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  -0.033  0.034  0.949  0.330  0.968 
   ESTSEC1  -0.038  0.048  0.636  0.425  0.962 
   ESTSEC2  -0.078  0.051  2.365  0.124  0.925 
   ESTSUP  -0.153  0.052  8.553  0.003  0.859 
   Constant  -2.771  0.189  215.920  0.000  0.063 
 
 
In  respect  of  the  number  of  diagnostic  tests  undergone  during  the  previous 
fourteen days (Table 6) the odds of utilization are slightly higher in the intermediate 
levels of education.  
                                                
13   The individual of  reference (IR) is a woman, resident in a town of less than 10,000 inhabitants, 
single, 53 years of age, with no known diseases, limitations or handicaps, who feels in very good health, 
has never smoked  but does not  exercise, lives alone, is employed , has no education and contributes to 
the national insurance régime.  
14   It  must  be  taken  into  account  that  the  IR  has  no  education,  so  the  significance  should  be 
understood as referring to each educational level in comparison with the “no education” category. 
15   0.0434 = (0.925 · 0.049 ) / (1 + (0.925 · 0.049 )) 
16    This  section  includes  attendance  by  both  general  practitioners  and  specialist  doctors  and 
nursing services during the last fourteen days.  
 
Table 6. Days spent undergoing diagnostic tests. analisis_ss 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
   EST_NO  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  0.136  0.044  9.638  0.002  1.146 
   ESTSEC1  0.108  0.063  2.953  0.086  1.114 
   ESTSEC2  0.180  0.065  7.540  0.006  1.197 
   ESTSUP  0.012  0.068  0.033  0.856  1.012 
   Constant  -3.112  0.248  158.058  0.000  0.045 
 
3.2. EDUCATION AND STATE OF HEALTH 
   
The subjective valuation of health is ranked in five categories from 1 (very good 
health) to  5 (very  bad), it  being  possible to summarise this information in  a single 
statistic by means of ordinal regression, which also provided a good fit (Nagelkerke's R
2  
of 29.9%). Taking as reference category 5 (state of health very bad), the probability of 
finding  individuals  of  higher  educational  level  becomes  progressively  lower  as  we 
approach the category of reference (Table 7): 
 
Table 7. Perceived state of health and educational level. Ordinal regression . 
  Estimation 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance 
Threshhold  [ESTASALU = 1]  -12.793  0.538  565.396  0.000 
   [ESTASALU = 2]  -4.933  0.127  1508.276  0.000 
   [ESTASALU = 3]  -1.463  0.124  139.417  0.000 
   [ESTASALU = 4]  0.807  0.125  41.483  0.000 
  [ESTASALU = 5]  2.938  0.133  491.345  0.000 
Location  ESTPRIM  -0.474  0.025  352.791  0.000 
   ESTSEC1  -0.775  0.034  515.357  0.000 
   ESTSEC2  -1.029  0.035  859.636  0.000 
   ESTSUP  -1.381  0.035  1543.438  0.000 
 
The threshold represents the category of reference of each of the categories of 
the  dependent  variable,  so  a  negative  value  implies  a  lower  probability  of  finding 
uneducated  or  illiterate  individuals  in  each  category  and  viceversa.  The  rest  of  the 
categories are now compared with the reference category so that their negative value 
implies a  situation in which all the levels of  health,  except the first, are  below the 
“uneducated” group. 
 
  The graph shows that the probability of finding individuals with a good state of 
health is higher at higher levels of education and viceversa. For example, of the 9,732 
individuals with higher education, 24.76% declare very good health and 65.98% good, 
while of the 10,551 illiterate or uneducated individuals only 3.73% declare themselves 
to be in very good health and 36.80% in good health. The indices are also significant for  
α < 0.001 in all categories. 
 
















With regard to suffering some type of limitation on carrying out everyday activities 
because of health, the results of the logistic regression, with the “limit” variable as 
dependent, show that a lower educational level is correlated with a higher probability of 
finding oneself limited in daily tasks. This variable was codified as 1 in the case of 
having been limited during the last fourteen days and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 8. Odds Ratios of being limited in everyday tasks 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
   EST_NO  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  -0.358  0.032  128.630  0.000  0.699 
   ESTSEC1  -0.512  0.047  116.845  0.000  0.599 
   ESTSEC2  -0.783  0.051  236.756  0.000  0.457 
   ESTSUP  -1.022  0.052  383.423  0.000  0.360 
   Constant  -1.976  0.170  135.383  0.000  0.139 
 
 
Individuals with higher education (Table 8) have an OR of being limited 0.36 times 
lower than the uneducated or illiterate. This implies, for example, that the probability of 
finding an uneducated IR who suffers limitation is 12.20%, while the probability of 
finding such an IR who has finished primary education  is 8.86%, and up to 4.77% if 
they have completed university education.  
 
As a measure of objective health we used enf_cron, representing the sum of chronic 
illnesses diagnosed, as dependent variable, codifying it as 1 if the individual had been 




Table 9. Diagnosis of one or more chronic illnesses. 
  B 
Standard 
error  Wald  Significance  Exp(B) 
   EST_NO  -  -  -  -  - 
   ESTPRIM  -0.219  0.031  48.916  0.000  0.803 
   ESTSEC1  -0.322  0.038  70.940  0.000  0.725 
   ESTSEC2  -0.486  0.039  156.409  0.000  0.615 
   ESTSUP  -0.627  0.039  261.525  0.000  0.534 
   Constant  1.017  0.149  46.335  0.000  2.766 
  
Individuals with higher educational level are also diagnosed with fewer illnesses, so if it 
is assumed that there is no discrimination against these individuals in the diagnosis, we 
can infer that their probability of having caught an illness is also lower. The differences 
between  educational  levels,  as  well  as  being  significant  in  statistical  terms,  are 
qualitatively  important.  73.45%  of  the  uneducated  IRs  had  been  diagnosed  with  a 
chronic illness, while the percentage falls to 59.79% in the case of IRs with higher 
education. 
 
3.3. EQUITY IN ACCESS 
 
  Table 10 shows the parameters estimated in the logistic regression models  in the 
form of ORs both of use of healthcare services and of suffering some kind of health 
problem according to educational level
17. In the case of the estasalud variable, and to 
standardize the parameters with the rest of the variables, an auxiliary logistic regression 
was designed with a dummy (estasalu1) codified as 0 – enjoying very good health - and 
1- not enjoying very good health
18 - the results of which are shown in the annex. 
  
Table 10. Odds Ratios of use of the SNS and of state of health  
Use of healthcare  services  State of health 
  farma_ss  medico_ss  analisis_ss  estasalu1  limit  enf_crónicas 
  EST_NO  1  1  1  1  1  1 
  ESTPRIM  0.972  0.968  1.146  0.686  0.699  0.803 
  ESTSEC1  1.004  0.962  1.114  0.526  0.599  0.725 
  ESTSEC2  0.919  0.925  1.197  0.462  0.457  0.615 
  ESTSUP  0.925  0.859  1.012  0.321  0.360  0.534 
 
  In the dimensions of use analyzed we observe that the increase in educational 
level slightly reduces the probability of using public healthcare services, though non- 
significantly in most cases. In the three state of health variables studied we observe that 
an increase in educational level is associated with better health, significantly for all 
educational  levels.  Altogether,  individuals  with  a  lower  educational  level  make 
somewhat more use of healthcare services but have a worse state of health.  
 
For the calculation of the index of inequity we estimated six auxiliary regressions by  
weighted minimum squares (MCP) 
19 (Table 11): 
 
Table 11. Horizontal equity in access to public healthcare services: results and 
tests. 
  Use 
( robust  s.e.) 
Average 
use     Health 
( robust s.e.)  Inequality  t 
(p-value) 
FARMA_SS  -0.0192 
(0.003) 
ESTASALU1  -0.1545 
(0.027)  -0.1391  -11.34 
(0.000) 
MEDICOS_SS  -0.0322 
(0.005) 
LIMIT  -0.1477 
(0.026)  -0.1323  -11.33 
(0.000) 
ANALISIS_SS  0.0031 
(0.036) 
-0.0154 
ENF_CRON  -0.1094 
(0.015)  -0.0940  -14.21 
(0.000) 
 
                                                
17   Represented in the exp( β ˆ ) column of the preceding tables. 
18   This codification guarantees that the OR’s will be comparable with the  rest of the variables that 
capture the state of  health in which 0 = good health and 1= bad health 
19    yj  being the ORs of use of each healthcare service or, alternatively, of suffering a state of health 
j and educ the variable of the educational level (range 1 -no education- to 5 -higher education), the 
general  results of the auxiliary MCP regressions were: 
  estimaciónR
2Use of healthcare services yfarma_ss = 1.0188 – 0.0192 educ0.6617ymedico_ss = 1.0370 
– 0.0321 educ0.9205yanalisis_ss = 1.0895 – 0.00314 educ0.0035 State of health yestasalu1 = 1.0547 – 0.1545 
educ0.9181ylimit = 1.0566 – 0.1477 educ0.9277yenf_cron = 1.0578 – 0.1094 educ0.9560  
  The indices of use show, in general, a  very gentle slope, negative in the case of 
consumption  of medicines and  doctors' visits, and positive,  though not significantly 
different from zero, in the case of diagnostic tests. The indices of health are always 
negative and significant. The greatest inequality occurs in the case of self-assessment of 
the  state  of  health  and  feeling  limited  for  everyday  activities,  with  a  slope  of 
approximately  15%.  However,  it  is  also  steep  in  the  case  of  diagnosis  of  chronic 
illnesses, with 10.94 %.  
 
The final index of horizontal inequity is the difference between the two indices. For 
purposes of simplification we constructed a single index of use as a weighted average of 
the three, using as weighting variable the proportion of each component of expenditure 
in the expenditure of the INSALUD [National Health Institute] for 1999. The weighted 
average of the slope of use is 0.0154 (farma_ss weights 23.2%, medicos_ss 15.9% and 
analisis_ss 19.1%), so the index of inequity varies between 13.91% and 9.40%, all of 
them significant (Table 11). 
 
For purposes of comparison, Table 12 reproduces the index of concentration for use 
(CM)  and  health  (CN)  following  the  methodology  of  Kakwani,  Wagstaff  and  van 
Doorslaer (1997) but according to educational level and controlling for all the variables 
of our model. The results are very similar to those obtained previously.  
 
Table 12. Indices of  concentration  and of inequality  according to educational level 
 




  CN 
(s.e.) 
HI 
FARMA_SS  -0.0148 
(0.006) 
ESTASALU1  -0.1962 
(0.052) 
0.185 
MEDICOS_SS  -0.0255 
(0.009) 
LIMIT  -0.1805 
(0.048) 
0.170 
ANALISIS_SS  0.0056 
(0.023) 
-0.01101 
ENF_CRON  -0.1137 
(0.030) 
0.103 
CM: Index of concentration  of  Use 
CN: Index of concentration  of  Health (need) 
HI: Index of horizontal inequity 
 
 
The analysis carried out therefore points to the existence of horizontal inequity, so that 
even  though  healthcare  utilization  is  independent  of  individuals'  educational  levels, 
those  with  a  worse  educational  level  use  healthcare  services  less  than  they  should 
according to their state of health, which is also worse.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
No  significant  statistical  association  was  found  between  educational  level  and 
utilization  of  healthcare  services.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relationship  between 
educational level and health, with the three proxy variables used (perception of health, 
days of limitation and number of chronic illnesses) shows a positive correlation, so that 
an increase in educational level is associated with a higher probability of enjoying better 
health. 
 
The horizontal inequity measured by the slope index of inequality proposed gives a 
range of statistically significant values between 13.91% and 9.40%, depending on cases, 
i.e. the significant inverse relationship between state of health and educational level is  
not reflected proportionately in the use of healthcare, implying that, with greater need, 
the access by individuals with lower educational level to public healthcare services is 
equal to that of the rest.   
 
These results are in harmony with, though slightly higher than, those obtained for the 
case of Spain in 1987 by van Doorslaer et al. (1997), whose index of inequality stands 
at 7.32%, and by Urbanos (2000) for the period 1987-1995 which vary between 8.23% 
and 4.37%; both studies use estimated income to rank individuals. Given the standard 
errors of these studies, such differences are not significant in the case of inequality 
measured by means of objective indicators (enf_cron) though they are significant when 
subjective measures are used (limit and estasalud). The existence of greater inequality 
when horizontal equity is measured in terms of education suggests that educational level 
is more relevant than income as a variable explaining inequality of access to healthcare 
services, in countries whose institutional frameworks guarantee a broad coverage of 
services irrespective of an individual's level of income. 
 
If the educational level acts as a barrier to  access and a source of inequity, it should be 
a variable to be considered in the design of healthcare policy, and particularly in the 
regional funding system.  A lower aggregate educational level of a region may be a 
variable  that  reflects  greater  healthcare  need  due  to  inequity  in  the  access  of  the 
population  group  with  lowest  educational  level.  In  this  hypothesis,  a  definition  of 
healthcare need that only included demographic variables would be insufficient to aim 
for a reduction of inequalities of access. 
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Table 13. Definitions of dependent variables and dummies. 
variable  definition  range  dummies (0,1) 
estasalu  self-assessment of state of health  1-very good 




tot_dias  days off work due to illness  1-14  no 
limit  limitation for performing everyday tasks  0-1  no 
sum_enf2  square of sum of chronic illnesses  0-289  no 
enf_cron  Diagnosis of a chronic illness. 
“other  illnesses”  [otrasenf]  includes  information  from 
questionnaire  on  AIDS    and  other  chronic  illnesses  or 
problems  
0-1  bronquit, alergias, epilespia, 
diabetes, tension, corazon, 
colesterol, cirrosis, artrosis, 
ulcera, hernias, circulac, 
anemias, nervios, jaquecas, 
menopausia, otrasenf 
genero  gender  0-woman;  
1-man 
no 
edad2  Square of age  529-9801  no 
edad  Age (in years) relative to mean  (-30)-46  no 
certimin  possession of disability certificate  0-no; 1-si  no 





tmuni  Size of  municipality of  resdidence  1-4  tmuni1: up to 10000 
tmuni2:up to  50000 
tmuni3: up to  500000 
tmuni4: over 500000 
fuma  Smoking habit  0:  does  not 
smoke  and  has 
never smoked 
1 smokes or has 
smoked. 
no 
num_ciga  number of cigarettes smoked per day   0 – 70  no 
ejercicio  Takes physical exercise at home and at work  0- none  
4 – daily 
no 
fuen  Main source of economic resources  1 - 9  fuen1: employed 
fuen2: self-employed 
fuen34: pensioner 
fuen57: on benefits 
fuen8: owner 
fuen9: other 
est  maximum level of completed education  1 – 5  estudiosno: illit. or       
         uneducated. 
estprim:  primary educ. 
estsec1: sec.educ.  1
st cycle 
estsec2: sec.educ.  2
nd cycle 
estsup:  univ. and higher 
education. 
afil  Availability of medical insurance   1-3  afil_pub: public insurance 
afil_priv: private insurance  
afil_no: no insurance 
accidente  Has suffered accident during last year  0 – 1  no 
  
 
Table 14. Summary of results of regressions for use of healthcare services 
depvar  farma_ss  farma  medico_ss  analisis_ss 
   B  Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B) 
ESTASALU2  0.381  0.000  1.464  0.312  0.000  1.366  0.428  0.000  1.535  0.094  0.140  1.098 
ESTASALU3  0.988  0.000  2.685  0.993  0.000  2.699  0.851  0.000  2.342  0.527  0.000  1.695 
ESTASALU4  1.476  0.000  4.375  1.496  0.000  4.464  0.879  0.000  2.409  0.479  0.000  1.615 
ESTASALU5  2.162  0.000  8.686  2.194  0.000  8.969  0.764  0.000  2.147  0.384  0.011  1.469 
TOT_DIAS  0.003  0.007  1.003  0.004  0.000  1.004  0.006  0.000  1.006  0.007  0.000  1.007 
LIMIT  0.767  0.000  2.154  0.996  0.000  2.708  0.551  0.000  1.735  0.297  0.000  1.346 
SUM_ENF2  -0.084  0.000  0.920  -0.087  0.000  0.917  -0.031  0.000  0.969  -0.034  0.000  0.967 
BRONQUIT  0.886  0.000  2.426  0.895  0.000  2.448  0.432  0.000  1.541  0.376  0.000  1.457 
ALERGIAS  0.782  0.000  2.187  0.866  0.000  2.377  0.290  0.000  1.336  0.364  0.000  1.439 
EPILESPIA  1.729  0.000  5.633  1.633  0.000  5.118  -0.013  0.932  0.987  0.385  0.028  1.469 
DIABETES  1.793  0.000  6.009  1.876  0.000  6.526  0.439  0.000  1.551  0.688  0.000  1.991 
TENSION  1.795  0.000  6.021  2.048  0.000  7.754  0.534  0.000  1.705  0.470  0.000  1.600 
CORAZON  1.494  0.000  4.456  1.724  0.000  5.606  0.416  0.000  1.516  0.551  0.000  1.735 
COLESTEROL  0.870  0.000  2.387  0.903  0.000  2.467  0.295  0.000  1.343  0.523  0.000  1.688 
CIRROSIS  0.418  0.008  1.519  0.316  0.061  1.371  0.306  0.036  1.358  0.428  0.016  1.535 
ARTROSIS  0.467  0.000  1.596  0.531  0.000  1.700  0.235  0.000  1.264  0.166  0.000  1.181 
ULCERA  0.858  0.000  2.358  1.020  0.000  2.773  0.443  0.000  1.557  0.375  0.000  1.454 
HERNIAS  0.582  0.000  1.790  0.535  0.000  1.708  0.225  0.000  1.253  0.451  0.000  1.570 
CIRCULAC  0.678  0.000  1.971  0.719  0.000  2.052  0.308  0.000  1.360  0.313  0.000  1.368 
ANEMIAS  0.719  0.000  2.052  0.890  0.000  2.435  0.495  0.000  1.641  0.492  0.000  1.636 
NERVIOS  1.008  0.000  2.739  1.107  0.000  3.026  0.241  0.000  1.272  0.181  0.000  1.198 
JAQUECAS  0.556  0.000  1.744  0.893  0.000  2.443  0.201  0.000  1.223  0.341  0.000  1.407 
MENOPAUSIA  0.838  0.000  2.312  0.823  0.000  2.276  0.489  0.000  1.630  0.578  0.000  1.782 
OTRASENF  0.934  0.000  2.546  1.018  0.000  2.768  0.479  0.000  1.614  0.509  0.000  1.664 
GENERO  -0.182  0.000  0.834  -0.305  0.000  0.737  -0.188  0.000  0.829  -0.225  0.000  0.798 
EDAD2  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.001  0.000  1.001  0.000  0.785  1.000  0.000  0.002  1.000 
EDAD  -0.020  0.000  0.980  -0.035  0.000  0.966  0.000  0.971  1.000  0.025  0.000  1.026 
CERTIMIN  0.112  0.102  1.118  -0.093  0.205  0.912  -0.247  0.000  0.781  -0.149  0.059  0.862 
ECIVIL2  0.082  0.019  1.085  0.126  0.000  1.134  0.132  0.001  1.141  0.219  0.000  1.244 
ECIVIL3  0.114  0.050  1.120  0.172  0.004  1.188  0.107  0.060  1.113  0.037  0.621  1.038 
ECIVIL4  -0.101  0.265  0.904  -0.102  0.243  0.903  0.090  0.379  1.094  0.312  0.013  1.366 
ECIVIL5  -0.193  0.073  0.824  0.101  0.315  1.107  -0.064  0.614  0.938  -0.376  0.043  0.686 
TMUNI2  0.041  0.197  1.042  0.084  0.007  1.087  -0.060  0.084  0.942  0.062  0.184  1.064 
TMUNI3  -0.053  0.077  0.948  0.021  0.478  1.021  -0.140  0.000  0.870  0.163  0.000  1.177 
TMUNI4  0.080  0.024  1.083  0.175  0.000  1.191  0.065  0.089  1.067  0.397  0.000  1.487 
THOGAR  -0.010  0.229  0.990  -0.033  0.000  0.968  -0.030  0.001  0.970  -0.035  0.005  0.965 
FUMA  0.011  0.754  1.011  0.043  0.184  1.044  0.048  0.238  1.049  0.042  0.438  1.043 
NUM_CIGA  -0.013  0.000  0.987  -0.007  0.000  0.993  -0.007  0.001  0.993  -0.012  0.000  0.988 
EJERCICIO  -0.040  0.035  0.961  -0.022  0.228  0.979  0.110  0.000  1.116  0.141  0.000  1.151 
FUEN2  0.062  0.050  1.064  0.042  0.149  1.043  0.080  0.033  1.083  0.250  0.000  1.284 
FUEN34  0.349  0.000  1.418  0.163  0.000  1.177  0.089  0.032  1.093  0.123  0.027  1.131 
FUEN57  0.234  0.001  1.264  0.138  0.045  1.148  0.202  0.011  1.224  0.136  0.216  1.145 
FUEN8  -0.003  0.983  0.997  0.153  0.326  1.165  0.202  0.241  1.224  0.692  0.000  1.997 
FUEN9  0.080  0.529  1.083  0.272  0.026  1.312  0.357  0.005  1.430  -0.338  0.109  0.713 
ESTPRIM  -0.029  0.397  0.972  0.048  0.175  1.049  -0.033  0.330  0.968  0.136  0.002  1.146 
ESTSEC1  0.003  0.936  1.004  0.141  0.001  1.151  -0.038  0.425  0.962  0.108  0.086  1.114 
ESTSEC2  -0.085  0.063  0.919  0.138  0.002  1.148  -0.078  0.124  0.925  0.180  0.006  1.197 
ESTSUP  -0.078  0.085  0.925  0.205  0.000  1.227  -0.153  0.003  0.859  0.012  0.856  1.012 
AFIL_PRIV  -0.399  0.000  0.671  0.126  0.000  1.134  -0.264  0.000  0.768  -0.135  0.006  0.874 
AFIL_NO  -0.026  0.431  0.974  0.240  0.000  1.271  -0.134  0.000  0.874  0.057  0.209  1.058 
ACCIDENTE  0.092  0.071  1.097  0.159  0.002  1.173  0.262  0.000  1.300  0.149  0.014  1.160 
CONSTANT  -3.011  0.000  0.049  -3.128  0.000  0.044  -2.771  0.000  0.063  -3.112  0.000  0.045 
-2log (vi/vs)  50663.390  53265.476  43827.118  29579.746 
R
2 (Nagelk)  0.4838  0.4632  0.1162  0.0895 
Cut-off  0.45  0.45  0.2  0.2 









Table 15. Summary of results of ordinal regression for self-assessment of state of health. 
  Estimation  Std. Error  Wald  Sig. 
Threshold  [estasalu = 1]  -12.793  0.538  565.396  0.000 
   [estasalu = 2]  -4.933  0.127  1508.276  0.000 
   [estasalu = 3]  -1.463  0.124  139.417  0.000 
   [estasalu = 4]  0.807  0.125  41.483  0.000 
  [estasalu = 5]  2.938  0.133  491.345  0.000 
Location   genero  -0.335  0.018  337.251  0.000 
   edad_m  0.072  0.004  398.633  0.000 
   edad2  0.000  0.000  108.058  0.000 
   certimin  1.496  0.046  1070.740  0.000 
   ecivil2  0.006  0.027  0.055  0.814 
   ecivil3  -0.156  0.042  14.048  0.000 
   ecivil4  0.333  0.072  21.730  0.000 
   ecivil5  0.339  0.085  15.728  0.000 
   tmuni2  -0.070  0.024  8.126  0.004 
  tmuni3  -0.083  0.023  12.977  0.000 
  tmuni4  -0.108  0.027  15.760  0.000 
  thogar  0.048  0.007  54.021  0.000 
  fuma  -0.134  0.027  24.234  0.000 
  num_ciga  0.010  0.001  65.030  0.000 
  ejercicio  -0.412  0.015  796.174  0.000 
  fuen2  0.016  0.025  0.429  0.512 
  fuen34  0.377  0.029  175.045  0.000 
  fuen57  0.284  0.057  24.916  0.000 
  fuen8  0.027  0.125  0.047  0.828 
  fuen9  0.322  0.096  11.226  0.001 
  estprim  -0.474  0.025  352.791  0.000 
  estsec1  -0.775  0.034  515.357  0.000 
  estsec2  -1.029  0.035  859.636  0.000 
  estsup  -1.381  0.035  1543.438  0.000 
  afil_priv  -0.306  0.025  143.923  0.000 
  afil_no  0.232  0.026  82.322  0.000 
  accidente  0.474  0.036  176.322  0.000 
   -2log (vi/vs)  736902.865 
   R
2 (Nagelk)  0.2985 
Table 16. Summary of results of logistic regressions for health. 
depvar  limit  enf_cron  estasalu1 
   B  Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B) 
GENERO  -0.096  0.000  0.908  -0.349  0.000  0.705  -0.229  0.000  0.795 
EDAD_M  -0.029  0.000  0.971  0.045  0.000  1.046  0.074  0.000  1.077 
EDAD2  0.001  0.000  1.001  0.000  0.081  1.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
CERTIMIN  2.516  0.000  12.374  1.246  0.000  3.478  1.084  0.000  2.958 
ECIVIL2  -0.142  0.000  0.868  0.136  0.000  1.145  0.023  0.557  1.023 
ECIVIL3  0.000  0.995  1.000  0.144  0.007  1.155  -0.078  0.379  0.925 
ECIVIL4  0.166  0.099  1.181  0.133  0.075  1.143  0.107  0.350  1.112 
ECIVIL5  0.342  0.003  1.408  0.335  0.000  1.398  -0.126  0.324  0.882 
TMUNI2  -0.068  0.047  0.934  0.079  0.004  1.082  -0.153  0.000  0.858 
TMUNI3  -0.023  0.473  0.977  0.093  0.000  1.097  -0.152  0.000  0.859 
TMUNI4  -0.067  0.082  0.935  0.014  0.650  1.014  -0.110  0.012  0.896 
THOGAR  0.018  0.058  1.018  0.009  0.225  1.009  0.014  0.182  1.014 
FUMA  -0.200  0.000  0.819  -0.117  0.000  0.890  0.009  0.810  1.009 
NUM_CIGA  0.010  0.000  1.010  0.002  0.250  1.002  0.008  0.000  1.008 
EJERCICIO  -0.565  0.000  0.568  -0.082  0.000  0.921  -0.321  0.000  0.726 
FUEN2  0.119  0.002  1.127  0.024  0.357  1.024  0.002  0.955  1.002 
FUEN34  0.250  0.000  1.284  0.274  0.000  1.315  0.238  0.000  1.269 
FUEN57  0.319  0.000  1.376  0.128  0.034  1.136  0.185  0.046  1.203 
FUEN8  0.192  0.246  1.212  0.129  0.368  1.138  -0.099  0.607  0.906 
FUEN9  0.235  0.074  1.265  0.037  0.729  1.038  0.124  0.418  1.132 
ESTPRIM  -0.358  0.000  0.699  -0.219  0.000  0.803  -0.377  0.000  0.686 
ESTSEC1  -0.512  0.000  0.599  -0.322  0.000  0.725  -0.642  0.000  0.526 
ESTSEC2  -0.783  0.000  0.457  -0.486  0.000  0.615  -0.771  0.000  0.462 
ESTSUP  -1.022  0.000  0.360  -0.627  0.000  0.534  -1.138  0.000  0.321 
AFIL_PRIV  0.000  0.996  1.000  0.040  0.139  1.041  -0.335  0.000  0.715 
AFIL_NO  0.489  0.000  1.630  0.404  0.000  1.498  0.052  0.177  1.054 
ACCIDENTE  1.016  0.000  2.763  0.475  0.000  1.607  0.154  0.013  1.166 
CONSTANTE  -1.976  0.000  0.139  1.017  0.000  2.766  4.898  0.000  134.046 
-2log (vi/vs)  43832.504  65564.391  37992.765 
R
2 (Nagelk)  0.2619  0.2240  0.1487 
Cut-off point  0.3  0.5  0.8 
%  correcto  81.94  68.46  77.43 
  
 
 